The Sandman

 

Image from Pixabay

In some countries in the world, criminal organizations kidnap poor devils and force them to send out scams seventeen hours a day, said Nathaniel Gleicher, global head of counter fraud from Meta this week at the annual ONE Conference in The Hague.

Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, among others, is not exactly the darling of privacy-minded citizens. But what Gleicher had to say at this conference matters. Because let the above sink in for a moment: people are being held against their will to bombard you, with bags under their red-rimmed eyes, with deceptive messages. In my world, scam refers to deception via false messages. For example, that text message about a troubled delivery, a WhatsApp message that starts with "Hi dad, I have a new phone number" or an email in which "the bank" announces a security check for which they need your cooperation. In short, pretty much everything that can be classified as phishing.

The reprehensible activities of cybercriminals are a problem for Gleicher, because they abuse his platforms. And apart from the moral obligation to do something about it, Meta also has a clear business interest here: if users are confronted with fraud on Instagram over and over again, they will eventually stay away, or at the very least they will become so suspicious that they will no longer click on anything, not even on bona fide contributions. And that means loss in revenues.

Meta divides fraud and scams into three types of problems: actors, behavior, and content. Actors include everything that has to do with false identity: you think a message is from a friend or a celebrity, but in fact there is a criminal behind it. Behavior includes everything a criminal does: deception, spam, even playing on your (romantic) feelings. The content type of problem encompasses celebrity bait, financial deals and charity, to name a few.

Gleicher wants to combat this vigorously, but his billions of normal, well-intentioned users should not suffer too much from it, because that would be bad for business. And so he focuses on the malicious ones. An important part of that is taking down fake accounts as quickly as possible. To do that, they look at the behavior of an account. For example, if a biography states that you live in the Netherlands, but all activity comes from a country far away, that is a red flag. And they use artificial intelligence to detect whether someone is misusing photos of celebrities. Think of a photo of Elon Musk with a golden tip to purchase bitcoins 'via this link' .

Criminals use mechanisms that are intended for honest people. Did you forget your password? Then click on a link and you can set a new password via the email sent to you. But if a criminal has hacked your email, he can do so on your behalf (it is therefore important to realize that your email is by far your most important account). Meta is trying to put a stop to this with innovative developments. For example, they are currently piloting a new method for account recovery: you have to supply a new selfie, which they compare to photos in your profile. The idea behind this is that criminals cannot simply get a fresh selfie of you.

Scams run across multiple layers, such as social media and banks. This makes it difficult for one party alone to recognize scams. At the ONE Conference, Gleicher announced the FIRE program ( Fraud Intelligence Reciprocal Exchange), in which British and Australian banks provide information to Meta. In an earlier phase of the program, this had already led to the removal of some 20,000 fake accounts.

The British talk about throwing a spanner in the works, the Americans throw a wrench, but the Dutch throw sand. Hence the title of this blogpost: Meta throws as much sand as possible in the works of internet criminals. You could say that Gleicher is the sandman of social media.

 

And in the big bad world…

• Meta still has a long way to go. [DUTCH]
• Meta has been heavily fined for insecurely storing millions of passwords.
• American customers of Kaspersky, which has since been banned there, were given an unsolicited installation of a different virus scanner.
• A British nuclear complex has been fined over cybersecurity shortcomings.
• Many solar panel inverters contain a default password, rendering them vulnerable. [DUTCH]
• The Netherlands Cybercrime Monitor has been published. [DUTCH]
• The Netherlands withheld its support for the European CSAM proposal, which aims to combat child pornography by monitoring all devices. [DUTCH]
• Of course, even the police employ people who do not recognize all phishing.
• police officers were on the payroll of an American cybercriminal.
• you may not need a VPN at all.

 

Intruders

 

Image from Pixabay

In 2007, a Dutch engineer walked into the Iranian nuclear complex of Natanz and installed a water pump there. This Erik van Sabben had a second client: the Dutch intelligence service AIVD. And that is how it happened that the centrifuges, which are needed to enrich uranium, went haywire because of the infamous Stuxnet virus. This is of course the ultra-short version of the story. The long, exciting story is in the book There's a War Going On But No One Can See It by investigative journalist Huib Modderkolk.

Earlier this week, a Dutch engineer walked into the Dutch nuclear complex of Almelo. Not to install anything, and not with a secret agenda. No, because that was me, together with about thirty colleagues, and we came for a tour and a presentation on a holistic view of security.

So I walked from the parking lot and came across a fence that was several meters high. There was a pedestrian gate in it, with an intercom. People were just walking from the other side, so I thought, I'll ask them. Because I was curious how they would react. It turns out that the gate wasn't locked at all. I was welcomed with a wide arm gesture and I was kindly shown where I had to report.

Is it really that easy to get in there? Well, fortunately it is not. You get a pass and with that you can go through a gate. After that, as a visitor, you can actually only go one way: to the reception building. And from there you are constantly accompanied.

October is traditionally security month. Many organizations – including ours – pay extra attention to security. One of the topics that we are putting in the spotlight this time is physical security. As an employee, you play a somewhat uncomfortable role in this. We want you to be a little less friendly. Intruders often enter because a friendly employee holds the door open for them. Most of the time, this doesn’t work at the entrances of our buildings, because you have to go through a swing gate. But think for a moment about those internal doors, which you have to open with a badge. Those secured doors are there for a reason: only authorized personnel should enter. Of course, you can hold the door open for someone you know belongs there, but for strangers, a friendly “Would you mind using your own badge?” is appropriate. And if you see someone walking around without a badge, you could just as kindly ask if that they have lost their pass, and if necessary, accompany them to the reception. I know this is difficult and that is why I am glad that this situation usually doesn’t arise. Usually, indeed. Maybe that is an extra reason to say something anyway if you see this.

Let's go back to the visit. The security manager first talked about the physical threats that a uranium enrichment plant has to deal with. You can easily figure out where those threats come from: criminals, terrorists and activists. The security measures are not that difficult either: fences, security guards, alarm systems. Then he went on to digital threats, in which the same actors play a role. And that's where the holistic ('all-encompassing') nature of their approach comes into play: the measures against cyber threats are of the same kind as those against physical threats. You have to look at it as a whole, because an attacker will not make a distinction between them either. He might try to disable the alarm systems via a virus or a hack, after which he gains physical access to the complex. And maybe he is not after uranium at all, but after data. In most organizations, crooks and spies will try to get the coveted data via the Internet, but in facilities like these, the really important data is air gapped : there is literally air between the computers in question and the outside world, in other words: they are only attached to a strictly closed network. So you really need to make entrance to get to it.

During that tour I came face to face with exactly the kind of installation that Stuxnet was all about: the centrifuges that enrich uranium in order to turn it into fuel for nuclear power plants. With Modderkolk's book in mind, this was quite a special moment. It really takes something to break those things. The oldest installation in Almelo has been running non-stop for forty years, without any maintenance. You can't find that in ICT.

Thanks to Urenco for the hospitality and to the Security Academy for the organization.

 

And in the big bad world…

• Industrial systems are very vulnerable when connected to the Internet.
• millions of cars were vulnerable due to an error on the manufacturer's website.
• some systems are better operated manually.
• Illegal services are also sometimes affected by burglars.
• NIST is putting an end to some stupid password practices.
• This Cyber Glossary explains various cybersecurity terms.
• ChatGPT can be hacked through fake memories.
• An international alliance of intelligence and security services has published advice for securing Active Directory.

 

Fighting a loosing battle

Image from Pixabay

 My search yielded 359 documents. Admittedly, a few of them were about research into and lamentations about the phenomenon sought. But that still leaves about 350 documents in which colleagues had written it down without batting an eyelid: Welcome01.

In the past, if you had forgotten your password after the holidays, you had to call the helpdesk. You would often get Welcome01 as a new password. I went to talk to them and explained that that wasn't such a good idea. After all, everyone got the same password. The thought behind it was probably: this is easy for the user and after logging in for the first time, they have to set a new password anyway. But hey, if I have bad intentions and know in advance what someone else's new password will be, I can use that. The helpdesk came to its senses and switched to generated - and therefore unpredictable - passwords. This service was automated away years ago and that put an end to Welcome01.

But not really, judging by the results of my search. Incidentally, I knew in advance what I would find, because it remains a loosing battle. We are an organization where applications and infrastructure are built. Of course, those things have to be tested. That’s often an automated process or at least a team effort. For testing, you need valid credentials. And precisely because testing is not a solitary activity, all team members who are involved must have the passwords of the test accounts. I get that. Two other things I do not understand: the password that is chosen, and the fact that I can find out about it.

Let's start with the first one: come on people, Welcome01! Can't you think of anything better? Yeah okay, it has a capital letter and no less than two numbers. Phew. The big weakness is of course the predictability of the password. There is a snicker when this password is mentioned, because we all know that it is used in so many places. Effectively it means that I know your password. And many others with me. You know that this is not what we want.

My second sneer is for the fact that I got hundreds of hits on my query. I don't have any special magic that gives me access to all information. That means that all those internal pages, where teams explain how and with what you can test all sorts of things, are not protected. And that anyone can access them. You're putting your house key under the flower pot, dear colleague.

Oh, they're just test accounts, you sigh. We would never do that in production! So why do it in test? It's a small effort to (a) have a decent password generated and (b) properly protect that password. It all comes down to attitude and behavior. Just as I'm convinced that secure behavior in your private environment radiates to work, I'm also convinced that your behavior in one environment influences your behavior in another; laxity on the left side easily leads to an "I'll just do it the same way on the right side" attitude when something needs to be fixed quickly. And when the problem is solved, everyone forgets that something still needed to be fixed.

In the past, it may not have been that bad. Back then, there was a strict separation between development and operations. With the advent of devops, that boundary has blurred: in many teams, all employees perform all activities – so both development and operations. And so they have to be able to access everything. Right through all DTAP streets. These are separate environments for development, testing, acceptance and production. But if you can access everything, then you can copy behavior from the 'less exciting' environments to the environment where it does matter. That makes us vulnerable.

The myth says that production data is only in the production environment. Yes, in the past we used test files that consisted of purely fictitious data. After a functional adjustment, the test data was adjusted or expanded. Nowadays, this is considered too laborious. And so (anonymized) production data is used. But it’s still production data. Combine that with the other myth that all employees are super reliable, and there’s your recipe for disaster. We like to look the other way when it comes to insider threat, but statistically speaking, every organization is entitled to a certain percentage of black sheep. Don't make it too easy for them. Let's agree that all those simple passwords will be replaced by something decent and that next week, I will no longer be able to access all those pages with passwords that I have open now.

 

And in the big bad world…

• This new ENISA threat report cannot report anything on insider threats because too few reports are made public.
• Insider threat doesn't stop when someone leaves the organization.
• the new version of macOS breaks several security tools.
• Russian AI is interfering in US election battle. (The article is a gift from the newspaper, hence the long link.)
• a hacking contest is not intended for real attacks.
• the FBI took down a Chinese IoT botnet.
• maybe your equipment is also part of that botnet. [DUTCH]
• The Dutch Data Protection Authority is receiving too little funding, according to the DDP. [DUTCH]
• Some people think that AI cameras will be a boon to humanity.

 

Witches and dark patterns

 

Image from Pixabay

She’s called Magica De Spell, Miss Tick, or Gundel Gaukeley, only to mention a few international names of this Disney character, and she lives on Mount Vesuvius. She is the sworn enemy of Scrooge McDuck, because she wants to steal his Number One Dime to melt it in the lava of her volcano into an amulet that should give her unprecedented powers.

The name of this cartoon character comes to mind when I hear the term dark patterns. Not only because of the similarity in color, but also because they have a similar goal: secretly taking something from you for their benefit.

You encounter dark patterns every day when you enter the internet and get one of those annoying cookie notifications. You have probably noticed that the button to agree to everything is often very prominent, while the option to deviate from it is really hard to find. Or you have to click very often because the option 'none' is missing. A dark pattern misguides the user in a certain direction and has you click on the most favorable option for that site, or entices you to make a purchase, or makes you provide more data than you should want. There are many forms of dark patterns. I will go through a few with you, and you will recognize them all. Incidentally, different sources use different names.

-        Confirshaming is a nice contraction of confirmation and shaming: when asked whether you want to order that delicious fresh food, the option 'no' is accompanied by an addition such as: "I'll have a microwave meal tonight".

-        Another great term is privacy zuckering, which of course includes a reference to Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook. This is about sharing more personal information with your network than you would actually like.

-        Maybe you wanted to download some software that you found on the internet. You clicked on that big green download button and got something completely different than what you wanted. You looked again and discovered that for the software you actually wanted, you should have clicked on a less obvious button. That's called disguised ads.

-        “Book now! Only 3 rooms left!” If you’ve ever booked a holiday, you’ll probably be familiar with this one. It’s called fake scarcity. By pretending that the offer is about to expire, they want to entice you to make a quick decision.

-        Sometimes you wonder if reviews are real. Reviews from fellow customers can help you make your choice, but if the provider himself is behind those cheering texts, then it is fake social proof.

-        I ran into Hard to Cancel when a lottery offered a guaranteed “prize” in the first month if you would subscribe. I don’t like to leave free money behind, but I had planned to cancel after the first month from the start. Unlike getting in, getting out could not be done online; I had to call them, and after a long wait I got someone on the line who reacted rather grumpily to my cancellation.

-        Another well-known form of dark patterns is called nagging. For example, you will repeatedly receive offers in an app to switch to the paid version, or to enable a certain function. Sometimes the rejection option takes the form of “maybe later”, which is like a promise on your part. The idea behind nagging is – as in real life – that you agree to something in order to get rid of it.

-        Oh yes, preselection: the option "I would like to receive your newsletter" is already conveniently checked. Often there is more behind it - such as wanting to give you the feeling that other people also choose a certain option.

All this brings us to the question: is all this allowed? Well, that depends. Sometimes it is just smart marketing, as in the example of confirshaming. The story is different if deception is evident, like with false reviews. The European Data Protection Board has published a report on this subject. Of course, the GDPR is discussed in it, because transparency is an important concept there, while the term dark patterns already indicates that transparency is hard to find. The GDPR also applies the principle of fairness: your data is processed in your interest and that is done in line with what you could reasonably expect. Privacy by default is also an important principle; all options that could infringe on your privacy must be turned off by default. The example of the newsletter is an example where they didn’t comply with this rule, just like those pages where you can set cookie preferences and where everything is turned on.

Some things are allowed, even if they are not so nice or even unethical. Maybe you did not know that this phenomenon is called dark patterns and what world lies behind it. Now that you know, you might deal with it differently in the future. I myself like to get back at someone who wants to deveice me, by doing the opposite of what they want. Magica De Spell will not get my Number One Dime!

 

And in the big bad world…

• Microsoft has rolled back a security patch, which left Windows 10 computers vulnerable for months.
• ChatGPT is not immune to social engineering.
• Microsoft is preparing for the world of quantum computing, which will make current cryptography vulnerable.
• Meta devours public Facebook and Instagram posts to feed its AI.
• a criminal was caught with a laptop full of stolen credit card information.
• The expiration of a domain name registration can have major consequences.
• This phishing email promises you free extra storage space at Google. [DUTCH]
• things are getting too hot for criminal Telegram users.
• you can still see WhatsApp’s 'view once' messages more than just once.

 

The hotel is not on fire

 

Image from Pixabay

BEEP – BEEP – BEEP. Capital letters can hardly convey the loudness of the alarm that went off as we sat eating breakfast in a hotel in Paris, our last stop on the way home. Capital letters are also too small to convey my surprise at what happened next.

That was, at first, nothing at all. People calmly continued nibbling on their croissants or sipping their coffee. I watched that for about three seconds, fascinated. Yes, I know that resignation in the office when the evacuation alarm goes off, but in a hotel I would have expected a bit more panic, or at least shocked looks; we all know the stories of burned-down hotels and their victims.

I urged my company to leave the hotel. Then, I first had to stop two family members from neatly clearing the table. Apparently, there is no button that switches from 'normal' to 'emergency' and ensures that your routine can be broken. But anyway, we could easily reach the exit of the breakfast room, simply because almost no one else wanted to do the same. While the noise of the alarm alone was enough reason to want to get out of there.

Now comes the part that I write with some shame. The way out led past the reception. From a distance the receptionist made it clear with broad arm gestures that we did not have to evacuate and that we could just continue with our breakfast. My shame lies in the fact that I turned around like a meek sheep, instead of asking how the receptionist was so sure that nothing was wrong. Of course it is possible that she knew what had triggered the alarm and that there was no reason to evacuate. The possible horror scenario was very different: there is a false alarm every now and then, so this time it will probably be nothing either. Just carry on.

That’s what they call cry wolf. If you keep shouting: "Watch out, a wolf!", while there's no such animal to be seen anywhere, then at some point people stop looking up. And if the fire alarm goes off several times a week for no apparent reason, then at some point the staff assumes that this time too, nothing is wrong. That can have fatal consequences. The funny thing is that everyone understands that - and does nothing about it.

Why did I go along with that? That is actually food for a psychologist and it is undoubtedly described extensively in hefty books, but if I may play the amateur psychologist for a moment: it must have something to do with power relations. That receptionist is a kind of an authority – she’s the face of the hotel, the one who tells you which room to sleep in and what time the breakfast room opens. And she stands behind a counter; that creates distance and underlines her authority. If someone like that says it's okay, then it is. But because of the possible horror scenario, I wish I had approached her and asked more questions.

That's how it works with computers, too. Warning messages are hardly read anyway - we know exactly where to find the click-away button. While there may well be a message among them that is more than worth reading, for example because it can make the difference between an organization that is paralyzed by ransomware and an organization that continues to work smoothly because you did take that message seriously.

Love must come from both sides here, too. If you are bombarded with all kinds of notifications, some of which are abracadabra to you, then I cannot expect you to respond appropriately in all cases. I often find less is more to be a hackneyed expression, but we might go a bit easy on those notifications, in order to give the really important ones the attention they deserve. And then I can expect you to take the time to read them and try to understand what you need to do.

Back to that hotel. At the office I know exactly the emergency exits are and I have actually used them before, but at this unknown location it did not occur to me to look for one. No, we headed for the main entrance of the hotel. But the normal route is not always the best route. It can even be a route into danger instead of away from it. I hereby promise myself to be alert to that next time. Are you in?

 

And in the big bad world…

• young people are, through their games, easy prey for criminals.
• the Russians are targeting us, again.
• the newly discovered Russian cyber unit blends its cyber efforts with physical activities.
• sextortion now comes with a photo of your house.
• it is difficult to get a grip on state spyware.
• Companies are sometimes attacked from within (more often than you think).
• there is a whole world of sentiment behind the arrest of the boss of Telegram.
• Telegram wants to improve moderation on the platform. [DUTCH]
• Dutch military is investing heavily in cyber. [DUTCH]
• security hardware can also be vulnerable. [DUTCH]

Like a thief in the night

 

Image from Unsplash

The road was winding, hilly and above all pitch dark. I had lit all the front lights: low beam, high beam and wide beam. She appeared out of nowhere. A darkly dressed woman who walked in the middle of the other half of the road, her gaze directed downwards.

We were more or less used to foxes crossing the road in the Provence at night, but this was something else. You are scared stiff. As your hand reflexively goes to the horn, all sorts of things go through your mind: what is that crazy person doing there, what a relief that she was on the other side of the road, and that one question that would haunt me for days: how would this have ended if she had been on my side of the road?

There wasn't much time to think. Because a car was approaching from the other side. The driver had to be warned! There are two ways to do that: honk, and signal with your lights. I did both, and an old annoyance about operating the high beams came to the fore again: the lever has no clear click between signaling and locking the high beams. Which means that when you want to signal, you often lock the high beams instead. And that's how the message gets lost - alarming flashing becomes irritating blinding. Other cars do it better: there you pull the lever towards you to signal and push it away from you to lock the high beams. Incidentally, the other driver had understood that something was wrong, because they slowed down.

Unexpected things that require due haste will always happen. Sometimes you’ll trust your reflexes (braking for a child crossing the road), other times you’ll make a note that you have to look at it sometime (a rattle in the car). The desired reaction time depends on two aspects. One is the time factor: how much time do you have to avert the disaster, or to repair damage that has already occurred? The other is the impact factor: how quickly do you have to react to minimize the undesirable consequences of an event?

In the past few days the Netherlands have seen an event in the 'urgent' category: a malfunction in the Defence network NAFIN, which not only affected Defence itself, but also the rest of the country. Eindhoven Airport (also a military airbase) came to a complete standstill, the communication networks of the emergency services failed, municipalities could not issue driving licences and citizens could not log in to government services because the authentication service, DigiD, was not available. In short: the impact (even socially) was great and a quick recovery was very much desired. Of course we all want to know what caused this malfunction. The Minister of Defence reported on this: "The cause of the problem was in the access to the so-called Netherlands Armed Forces Integrated Network (NAFIN). Due to an error in the software code, a problem arose in the time synchronization on the network. As a result, it was not possible to connect to this network. There is currently no indication that the malfunction was caused by a malicious party."

The latter was said quite quickly, so quickly that I initially wondered whether it was not more of an incantation than reality. But now there is a plausible story: components of the network that wanted to connect to each other were denied access because their clocks were not running in sync; that is how I interpret the ministerial explanation. Compare it to a link that you get when you click on "I forgot my password" somewhere. Those links often have a limited validity period. If a clock is not set correctly somewhere, those links won’t work, no matter how quickly you get to it.

The Minister of Justice and Security joined the discussion with a striking statement: “Get used to it”, was his much-quoted opinion. This ministry also includes the NCTV (National Coordinator for Terrorism and Security) and the NCSC (National Cyber Security Centre), so it is not just anyone who said this. Should we be concerned about this statement? Some think so, because it would mean that people at the highest levels do not see the seriousness of the situation. I myself think: hey, we have been used to it for a long time already, because things often go wrong and then they are simply fixed. However: most incidents do not have such a big impact. I can think of a few scenarios in our own organisation, for example, which would give us a bit more than the usual headache and could have a significant social impact. We would rather not get used to that.

The NAFIN malfunction had actually already been resolved, but this morning (Friday) it turned out that the airport police is still experiencing problems. If you are going to fly in the coming days, don't forget your passport. Because issuing an emergency passport is not an option for the time being.

 

And in the big bad world…

• Many readers of this article have an opinion about the NAFIN problems. [DUTCH]
• Prime Minister Schoof was not that impressed by the major disruption. [DUTCH]
• Seattle Airport is likely to have suffered a cyber attack.
• this journalist gives an eyewitness account of the situation in Seattle.
• iPhones and iPads crash when you type four specific characters in a row.
• France has arrested the of Telegram’s CEO.
• Signal 's boss was interviewed in the context of the chat app's tenth anniversary.
• It's always a shame when a well-intentioned action strongly resembles phishing.
• you better throw away this security camera.
• a bank employee sold customer data to criminals. [DUTCH]
• Ireland is seeing more and more WhatsApp hacks (and it could happen in your country too).

Alarm at the pool

 

Image from Pixabay

In the past, 100 to 150 children drowned every year in France. A significant portion of these tragic accidents occurred in private swimming pools. That is why legislation was introduced in 2004 requiring safety measures. The number of annual drownings in private swimming pools fell to 20-50.

Nowadays, French private swimming pools must have a fence, cover or alarm system. During the holidays we encountered the latter, which was intended to alert parents if a child falls into the water. The owner of the house had explained to us how it worked: hold down one button on the remote control, then press the other and voilà, the alarm was turned off and the pool was open for business.

If you forgot to turn it off and jumped into the water, you were treated to a loud alarm sound just a moment later. Then someone had to quickly grab the remote control and press the buttons. It soon became apparent that this did not work properly: only after several attempts did the alarm go silent. It was unclear what was wrong. A light came on on the remote control, so apparently the batteries were still good. The buttons were soft and vague to the touch, so you tended to press harder and harder. Perhaps the circuit board under the buttons had become damaged over the years. Anyway, this couldn't go on any longer.

Fortunately, there was an alternative. There was a magnet in the garage with which you had to touch the alarm box in the swimming pool to switch off the alarm. That worked flawlessly and saved us from a lot of hassle. Although sometimes things still went wrong, because if no one had been in the pool for fifteen minutes, the alarm was automatically activated. If you didn't think about that at the next refreshing dive, you were still in trouble.

The lights on the alarm didn’t really help, either. There were two of them: one red, the other green. If the green light was on, you were not allowed to swim, and if the light was red, you were all right. From the alarm’s point of view, I get it: if the alarm is on, the swimming pool is protected, and therefore the green light is on. Alarm off means unsafe, so red. But from the user's point of view, this is not convenient, because one usually crosses the road when the light is green.

No concerned neighbors showed up on the doorstep in the event of a (false) alarm. They simply lived well out of earshot. But what would this be like in a more densely built-up environment? I don’t think that the entire neighborhood would show up with swimming rings and rescue hooks at the first beep. Only if the alarm continued, a slightly irritated neighbor might perhaps come and take a look. But isn't it already too late then?

And yet the legislation appears to be quite effective. I think that a sturdy fence with a child-resistant lock works best - preventive measures prevent misery, while detective measures only signal that there is a (possible) problem. Prevention is better than cure; not being able to fall into the pool is better than having to be fished out half drowned.

I could make a clever link to my field of expertise here, but you get the idea yourself. Automatically throwing away a phishing email before it ends up in your inbox causes less hassle than clearing up the mess after you have clicked on that link. Blocking access to a rogue website is more effective than having to respond to a malware infection. Not asking your customer for data that you don't actually need is more sympathetic than having to inform your customer that their data have been leaked - yes, sometimes not doing something is also a measure.

Of course, this is not a disqualification of all those security systems that signal that something may be wrong. We really need that too. Defense in depth means that you build up protection in layers. If someone has left the pool gate open, an alarm system can still prevent a lot of grief. Just as it is very important that you recognize phishing and handle it correctly - in case the security systems fail to catch it. It's a shame that French legislation only requires one measure.

 

And in the big bad world...

• it's a bad idea to save passwords in your browser.
• you can of course also hack the gears of expensive racing bikes.
• Household robots are also not safe from hackers.
• There are still programmers who think hardcoded passwords are a good idea.
• Maybe it wasn't such a good idea to connect all our solar panels to the internet.
• the Dutch Data Protection Authority warns against incidents involving artificial intelligence. [DUTCH]
• Electronic equipment is now forbidden during Cabinet meetings. [DUTCH]
• the Prime Minister himself explains the importance of this measure. [DUTCH]
• this Android malware plunders your bank account using your physical bank card.